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Welcome to the tenth Faculty of Philosophy 
Newsletter. Charles de Gaulle is supposed 
to have said that if you want things to 
stay the same, you have to perpetually 
renew them; and in the Faculty of 
Philosophy we have been trying to follow 
his advice. The Faculty is known for its 
excellence in research, and for its rigorous 
undergraduate degree programme. But in 
order to maintain these things, we need 
to be thinking constantly about how we 
might develop and improve. Two recent 
developments stand out. 
First, this newsletter marks the official 
opening of a major fundraising campaign 
to support graduate students. Every 
leading philosophy department depends 
upon the quality of its graduate students, 
and we have been fortunate in Cambridge 
in having many superb students who 
have gone on to teach philosophy all over 
the world. Graduate students are not just 
the researchers of the future, they are the 
researchers of the present.
But it has become increasingly difficult 
in recent years for graduate students 
in philosophy to fund their education. 
Despite the exceptionally generous 
support of some of our alumni, as well 
as from the Colleges and the University, 
many of our graduate students struggle 
to support themselves during their period 
of study. Here in the UK, we compare 
unfavourably with the top US institutions, 
where graduate students are normally 
fully-funded for the whole of their PhD. 
With the likelihood that the UK’s Arts and 
Humanities Research Council will stop 
funding MPhil students in the coming years, 
the situation looks as if it will get worse.
It is for this reason that we are launching 
a campaign to develop a fund for the 
support of graduate students in philosophy 
at Cambridge. Our ambitious ultimate aim 
is to be able to fully fund all our graduate 
students, MPhil and PhD. The campaign 
has been initiated by some very generous 
donations from our alumni, and a brochure, 
Thinking Through the 21st Century: The 
Next Generation of Cambridge Philosophers 
has been produced by the University’s 
Development Office. For a copy of this 
brochure, please contact the Development 
Office: www.campaign.cam.ac.uk. For other 
inquiries about this campaign, please feel 
free to contact me directly.
The second exciting recent 
development—and our major news for 
this year—is that we have appointed 
Richard Holton and Rae Langton from the 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology to 
professorships in the Faculty, starting in 
September this year. They are both world-
leading philosophers who have made 
substantial contributions to a number of 
different areas of the subject. 
Richard works especially on the 
philosophy of mind and its connections 
with psychology and moral philosophy, 
including decision-making, making  
up your mind, weakness of the will  
and temptation, among other things.  
His work draws on empirical work in 
psychology, and he is currently pursuing 
an inter-disciplinary project on the  
nature of addiction.
Like Richard, Rae works in a number 
of different areas of the subject—ethics, 
feminist philosophy, metaphysics and the 
history of philosophy—and like him too, 
she has made significant contributions 
to them all. She is also well known for 
her work on questions about the ethics 
of pornography and objectification. She 
has recently been made a member of 
the American Academy of Arts and 
Sciences, and will give the prestigious John 
Locke Lectures in Oxford in 2015. We are 
delighted that they are joining the Faculty.
From the Chair
Tim Crane
Professors Rae Langton and Richard Holton to join the Faculty







Missed one of our events?
Paulina Sliwa works 
mostly on ethics and 
epistemology, and is 
particularly interested in 
questions where those 
two intersect. Recently, 
she has been thinking 
about moral knowledge, particularly its role 
in praise, blame, and morally good action. 
She’s also interested in how our various 
cognitive imperfections—our proclivity to 
biases and computational limitations—bear 
on how we should form and revise our 
beliefs. Paulina comes to Cambridge from 
MIT in the other Cambridge, where she 
wrote a dissertation on moral testimony. 
Prior to that she was an undergraduate 
at Balliol College, Oxford, where she read 
Physics and Philosophy. She is excited to 
join the vibrant research and teaching 
community at Cambridge!
Angela Breitenbach’s 
research focuses on 
the history of modern 
philosophy, specifically 
the philosophy of Kant, 
as well as questions in 
philosophy of science, 
philosophy of biology, and aesthetics. 
Among other things, she is currently 
working on a problem at the intersection 
of these interests, concerning a Kantian 
conception of the role of beauty in science. 
She has an undergraduate degree and 
MPhil from the University of Cambridge 
and a doctorate from the Humboldt-
University of Berlin. After three years as a 
Junior Research Fellow at Sidney Sussex 
College, Cambridge, and three further 
years as a Lecturer at the University of East 
Anglia, she is now very happy to return 
to the Cambridge Philosophy Faculty.
Tim Button’s first book, 
The Limits of Realism (OUP), 
will be released in 2013. 
It explores how sceptical 
angst (“am I just a brain 
in a vat?”) has influenced 
debates about what there 
is in the world, and about how we are able 
to talk and think about it. From 2010 to 
2012, Tim was a research fellow at St John’s 
College, Cambridge, and he has remained 
there since his appointment as a lecturer. 
People
Meet our new appointments
He has also recently been a visiting scholar 
at the University of Texas Austin, and a 
visiting fellow at Harvard.
Luca Incurvati works 
on the philosophy of 
mathematics, logic and 
language, with occasional 
forays into metaphysics. 
He has an undergraduate 
degree and a masters from 
Rome “La Sapienza”, and an MPhil and a PhD 
from Cambridge. Before his appointment 
as a temporary lecturer in the Faculty, he 
was a Junior Research Fellow at Magdalene 
College. His work has appeared in journals 
such as Analysis, Erkenntnis, Journal of 
Philosophical Logic, Philosophical Studies and 
Review of Symbolic Logic. He has ongoing 
projects on conceptions of set, naturalism 
in the philosophy of mathematics and the 
notion of rejection.
Nicholas Vrousalis, 
previously at KU Leuven 
(Belgium), has joined the 
Faculty as a temporary 
lecturer. He read 
Economics at Trinity Hall, 
Cambridge. After some 
graduate work in Economics, he went 
to Oxford to do a doctorate in Political 
Philosophy with G.A. Cohen. His research 
is concerned with distributive ethics, 
theories of exploitation, Marxism, and the 
conceptual space at the intersection of 
Analytical Marxism and Critical Theory. He 
is presently planning two Faculty-based 
workshops, one on domination and one on 
hate speech.
Chris Thompson has 
joined the Faculty as 
a temporary lecturer. 
He recently completed 
his PhD in philosophy 
at LSE. Prior to that, he 
worked as a civil service 
policy advisor in the UK and New Zealand 
civil services. His research interests lie 
in political philosophy, epistemology, 
and their intersection in the philosophy 
of public policy. His focus is on ‘social 
epistemic mechanisms’, that is institutions 
and procedures that allow democracies to 
make correct decisions. His thesis provided 
an account of how political agents search 
for and extract information from the 
environment, and how this is then pooled 
into the social choice. He is currently 
extending this research and developing 
an epistemic account of deliberative 
democracy—the conditions under which 
discussion and debate increases the 
accuracy of decisions.
 
Brian Pitts is a post-
doctoral researcher who 
works mostly on the 
philosophy of science, 
both the philosophy of 
physics (especially space 
and time) and general 
philosophy of science. He studied at Notre 
Dame (Philosophy/HPS) and the University 
of Texas at Austin (Physics). He is interested 
in the idea of progress and achieving 
reflective equilibrium between ostensible 
scientific examples and normative 
methodology. In particular, in what can 
be said in bringing together Bayesian and 
(more or less) reliabilist epistemologies. 
John Maier was 
appointed as a post-
doctoral researcher 
working on pragmatism. 
He works primarily 
in metaphysics, the 
philosophy of action, 
and the philosophy of language. He has 
previously held positions at the University 
of Sydney, the Australian National 
University, and the University of Colorado, 
and received his PhD. from Princeton 
in 2008. He has recently completed a 
monograph on agency and modality. 
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Professor Jane Heal retired from the 
Faculty at the end of 2012 after 26 years. 
Daughter of a notable pair of Oxford 
philosophers, William and Martha Kneale, 
she first arrived in Cambridge in 1964 as 
an undergraduate at New Hall to read 
history, changing to Philosophy (then 
‘Moral Sciences’) after two years. Jane 
then stayed on to do a PhD, working on 
problems in the philosophy of language. 
After two years post-doctoral study 
in the USA, she held a lectureship at 
Newcastle University, before returning to 
Cambridge in 1986. Jane was awarded 
her personal professorship in 1999—the 
same year that she became the first ever 
female president of St John’s College.
In 1997 she was elected a Fellow of 
the British Academy—still one of only 
a handful of women in philosophy to 
receive this honour. Decisive here, no 
doubt, was her pioneering work in 
what came to be known as ‘Simulation 
Theory’. Jane developed the thought 
that our understanding of other people 
is achieved by, so far as we are able, 
placing ourselves inwardly in their 
situation and then allowing  
our thoughts and emotions to run 
forwards in a kind of imaginative 
experiment. The competing idea, that 
we learn to operate a kind of theory 
that links humans’ physical behaviour 
and external conditions to their mental 
states was, she argued, at most a far 
less important factor in our attempts to 
understand others.
Jane has written extensively on the 
philosophy of mind and language and 
published two books, Fact and Meaning 
(Blackwell 1989) and Mind, Reason and 
Imagination (CUP 2003). During her 
long career at Cambridge she made 
a major contribution to the Faculty, 
serving on several committees and 
being Chair of the Faculty Board. She 
was instrumental in the success of 
the Faculty’s fundraising appeal, and 
played a large part in the design of the 
Faculty’s new premises. In retirement, 
Jane continues to supervise graduate 
students and to pursue her research 
in the philosophy of mind. She will 
also spend more time in her garden.
Awards, Honours and Promotions
Professor Huw Price has been elected to  
a Fellowship of the British Academy. 
Alex Oliver was promoted to a 
Professorship. He was also awarded a 
major research grant from NWO in the 
Netherlands for a project on trust in 
banking with Professor Boudewijn de  
Bruin (Groningen). 
Emeritus Professor, Onora O’Neill was 
appointed as Chair of the Equality and 
Jane Heal retires after 26 years
Human Rights Commission in October 
2012 for a period of 3 years. 
Dr Angela Breitenbach has been awarded 
a 2 year Leverhulme Trust Research 
Fellowship from May 2013. Dr Adam 
Caulton was awarded a British Academy 
Postdoctoral Fellowship to work on 
philosophy of physics. Dr Brian Pitts has 
a 2-year Templeton grant for 2014–16. 
Graduate student Rob Trueman was 
awarded the Analysis Trust Studentship for 
2012–13, here in the Faculty.
Alumni Festival 2013
28 September 2013
Professor Michael Potter will give 
a talk entitled ‘Wittgenstein on 
Religion’. Further details are available 
from: www.alumni.cam.ac.uk.
‘Logic and Assertion: How are  
they related?’
Michael Potter will give his 
inaugural lecture as Professor of 
Logic. Details to be announced.
Information about other 
forthcoming events is available 
from the Faculty website.
Future Events
Departures
Two long-serving members of support  
staff recently retired. We bid farewell to  
Mrs Margrit Edwards in December 2012 
after 25 years with the University, 16 of  
these as Principal Secretary in the Faculty. 
Mrs Lesley Lancaster retired in April  
2013 from her role as Graduate Secretary 
after 22 years. They have both played an 
invaluable role in the smooth running 
of the Faculty. Staff and friends attended 
their retirement parties, to celebrate their 
contribution and to wish them well.
Dr Fraser MacBride left to take up a  
Chair at the University of Glasgow in 
January 2013. 
Dr Serena Olsaretti was appointed as 
Research Professor at UPF (Barcelona).
Student Prizes
Katharine Jenkins (Emmanuel) was 
awarded the Matthew Buncombe prize 
for best overall achievement in the MPhil. 
The Craig Taylor prize for best performance 
in the Tripos went to Hugo Havranek 
(Peterhouse) for Part IB and Bastian Stern 
(Trinity) for Part II.
Routledge Lecture in Philosophy
Professor Susan Wolf (Chapel Hill, North 
Carolina) gave the 7th Routledge Lecture 
in Philosophy on 21 February 2013. Her 
talk entitled ‘Responsibility, Moral and 
Otherwise’ examined the nature of 
responsible agency. A typescript is available 
from the faculty website. We are grateful to 
Routledge for their continuing support.
Jane Heal at her retirement garden party, St John’s
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“Erroneously supposed to do no harm”
Huw Price discusses a theme in his inaugural lecture
The Queen and Prince Philip on the balcony of Buckingham Palace.  
Photo: Carfax from Wikimedia Commons
Bertrand Russell’s celebrated lecture ‘On 
the Notion of Cause’ was first delivered 
on 4 November 1912, as his Presidential 
Address to the Aristotelian Society. It gave 
Russell a place beside Hume as one of the 
great causal sceptics, and twentieth century 
philosophy one of its most famous lines: 
“The law of causality”, Russell declares, 
“Like much that passes muster among 
philosophers, is a relic of a bygone age, 
surviving, like the monarchy, only because it 
is erroneously supposed to do no harm”.
On 1 November 2012, taking advantage 
of a happy accident of timing, I used 
my inaugural lecture as Bertrand Russell 
Professor to mark the centenary of ‘On 
the Notion of Cause’, and to ask what its 
conclusions look like with the benefits of 
a century’s hindsight. As I explained, the 
story has many Cambridge connections. 
Indeed, much of what Russell set out to 
achieve was given proper if sadly sketchy 
foundations in one of Frank Ramsey’s late 
papers from 1929, just four months before 
his untimely death. (It has taken the rest of 
us most of a century to catch up).
Preparing my lecture, I wondered what 
Russell had had in mind in the other 
part of his famous line. Just what, in his 
view, was the harm that the monarchy 
is erroneously thought not to do? I 
assumed this would be an easy curiosity 
to satisfy—somewhere, the prolific Russell 
would have written about the monarchy 
at greater length. But I searched in vain.
Eventually I wrote to Nicholas Griffin 
of the Russell Archives at McMaster. He 
told me that there was nothing to find, 
not even in Russell’s correspondence, 
so far as he knew it. But he suggested a 
context for Russell’s remark. In 1910 Britain 
had concluded a constitutional crisis, 
bought on by the Liberal government’s 
determination to remove the veto power 
of the House of Lords. A crucial step 
was the King’s indication that he would 
support the Government, if necessary, 
by creating sufficient new Liberal peers 
to ensure passage of the Bill through the 
Lords (Russell would have been one of 
those new peers, in that counterfactual 
world). Professor Griffin suggested that 
in the light of the King’s support, some 
on the Liberal side were saying that the 
monarchy wasn’t so bad after all; and 
that Russell may have been taking the 
opportunity to indicate that he was made 
of sterner stuff—that the old battle lines 
of the Russell’s remained unchanged.
But this doesn’t tell us what Russell 
thought the harm in question actually was, 
at that point in the nation’s history—when, 
thanks in part to Russell’s own ancestors, 
it had long been a “crowned republic”, 
as Tennyson put it (a fact reaffirmed in 
the recent crisis). So, as my centenary 
footnote to Russell’s great paper, I offered 
my own proposal. In my view, there is a 
significant harm associated with modern 
constitutional monarchies (of which 
there are nine or ten in all, most of them 
in Western Europe)—a consequence 
remarkable for the fact that although in 
plain sight, it goes unmentioned, and 
apparently almost unnoticed. It is indeed 
“a relic of a bygone age”, as Russell puts it, 
whose cost is hidden from us by the sheer 
familiarity of the system of which it is a 
consequence—by the fact that a traditional 
picture holds us in its grip, as Wittgenstein 
might have put it. Moreover, while I don’t 
suggest that this is what Russell actually 
had in mind, it is something that he in 
particular would have had reason to have 
in mind—it resonates in several ways with 
aspects of his own life. In all senses, then, it 
is an excellent fit.
The point in question is so simple that it 
is apt to seem banal. In selecting children 
on a hereditary basis for public office, 
we deny them a freedom we take for 
granted for our own children, to decide 
for themselves what they want to make of 
their lives. To see the issue in perspective, 
imagine such a system being proposed in 
some contemporary democracy, starting 
from scratch. In future, various public 
offices would be filled by selecting infants 
who would be brought up to fill the roles 
in question. A knock at the door might 
signal that your child had been chosen to 
be a future Archbishop of Canterbury, say. 
The main objection would not be that it 
was undemocratic, but that it was absurdly 
unfair to the individuals concerned. 
The fact that we do find this system 
acceptable in practice, for one particular 
public office, turns mainly on its sheer 
familiarity—that’s just how things are 
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done. Perhaps also, as Russell thinks in the 
case of causation, we are in the grip of 
bad metaphysics: we think of royalty as a 
natural kind, and hence imagine that it is 
a natural matter that royal children should 
be brought up to play these roles—that’s 
the kind of beings they are, as it were. The 
picture holds us captive, and central to it is 
the fantasy that what these families enjoy 
is a matter of entitlement and privilege, not 
constraint and obligation.
It is easy to see how we got to this point, 
from the distant past this picture actually 
depicts: on the one hand, a great erosion 
of opportunity on the side of royalty, as—
thanks in part to Russell’s ancestors in the 
British case—its powers were curtailed; on 
the other, an even greater expansion of 
opportunity on the side of ordinary people, 
especially children, as we came to accept 
that young people should make their life 
choices for themselves. The combination 
means that the heirs to modern democratic 
monarchies are now marooned on little 
islands of under-privilege, impoverished not 
only compared to their own ancestors, but 
also, more importantly, compared to the 
standards that now exist in the community 
at large.
This may seem an exaggeration. Couldn’t 
an heir simply abdicate, if she didn’t want 
to rule? Well, yes, but certainly not simply! It 
would be a difficult, public and personally 
costly process. She would be disappointing 
a nation’s expectations, impressed on her 
throughout a childhood in which she had 
been taught that this is her duty, her place 
in life (there’s the small matter of putting 
a sibling in the hot seat, too). Why should 
her freedom require her to scale such a 
formidable fence, when our children come 
and go as they please?
This was my proposal concerning the 
monarchy’s hidden harm, and it is easy 
to see why I took it to be Russellian in 
spirit. Russell felt the constraints of his 
own childhood very deeply, and was 
greatly relieved to escape them when 
he came of age. Later, when he himself 
became a father, he was an advocate 
of allowing children as much freedom 
as possible. Famously, too, he was an 
opponent of conscription. He also had a 
talent for calling our attention to those 
uncomfortable truths that hide themselves 
in plain sight. I think he would have felt 
it entirely appropriate to call attention to 
this one.
Bertrand Russell in 1910. Photo courtesy of 
Trinity College, Cambridge 
A podcast and typescript of Huw 
Price’s inaugural lecture are available 
from the Faculty website.
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The LimiTs of ReaLism
Tim BuTTon
Tim Button explores the relationship between minds, words, and world. He argues 
that the two main strands of scepticism are deeply related and can be overcome, 
but that there is a limit to how much we can show. We must position ourselves 
somewhere between internal realism and external realism, and we cannot hope to 
say exactly where.
304 pages | June 2013 | Hardback | 978-0-19-967217-2 | £40.00
spinoza on phiLosophy, ReLigion, and poLiTics  
The Theologico-PoliTical TreaTise
susan James 
Susan James explores the revolutionary political thought of one of the most 
radical and creative of modern philosophers, Baruch Spinoza. His Theologico-
Political Treatise of 1670 defends religious pluralism, political republicanism, 
and intellectual freedom. James shows how this work played a crucial role in the 
development of modern society. 
360 pages | January 2012 | Hardback | 978-0-19-969812-7 | £30.00
mind, meaning, and ReaLiTy  
essays in PhilosoPhy
d. h. meLLoR
Mind, Meaning, and Reality presents fifteen philosophical papers in which D. H. 
Mellor explores some of the most intriguing questions in philosophy.  These 
include: what determines what we think, and what we use language to mean; how 
that depends on what there is in the world and why there is only one universe; and 
the nature of time.
248 pages | August 2012 | Hardback | 978-0-19-964508-4 | £25.00
pLuRaL Logic 
aLex oLiveR and TimoThy smiLey 
Alex Oliver and Timothy Smiley provide a new account of plural logic. They argue 
that there is such a thing as genuinely plural denotation in logic, and expound a 
framework of ideas that includes the distinction between distributive and collective 
predicates, the theory of plural descriptions, multivalued functions, and lists.
326 pages | May 2013 | Hardback | 978-0-19-957042-3 | £40.00
Order online: www.oup.com/uk
For more information please contact philosophy.uk@oup.com 1
The Wittgenstein-Skinner Archive
Arthur Gibson on Wittgenstein’s rediscovered archive
In early October 1941 German bombers 
attacked Oakington RAF base. Victims  
were rushed to hospital in Cambridge. 
The only slightly later admission of a polio 
patient was unnoticed, by-passed, being 
left untreated for very many hours in a 
corridor. This is how Wittgenstein’s closest 
friend Francis Skinner came to die at the 
age of 29.
Within the week of Skinner’s funeral, in 
a state of trauma, Ludwig attempted to 
resign his Philosophy Chair; arranged to 
leave Cambridge for Guy’s Hospital working 
to fulfil his, now memorial, plan with 
Francis; attended Francis’ funeral; reclaimed 
from Skinner’s family the Wittgenstein-
Skinner Archive, and posted them to 
Skinner’s school friend, Reuben Goodstein.
Eventually Goodstein gave the Archive 
to the Mathematical Association. It was 
a much-appreciated invitation from the 
Association (and full acknowledgement 
to it in references here), with the support 
of Trinity College, for me to research and 
prepare this unpublished Archive for  
book publication.
Detailed research on the Archive yields 
the following context. Wittgenstein’s 
relationship with Skinner was redolent of 
his intense friendship with David Hume 
Pinsent. Dying in World War I, 1918—some 
months short of his 29th year, the Tractatus 
was dedicated to Pinsent. Probably this 
is mirrored in Wittgenstein’s gift of it to 
Francis (shown on the right).
In different generations both Pinsent 
and Skinner lived in the same Trinity 
College Court as Wittgenstein, studying 
mathematics; each went with Ludwig 
to Norway, and both wrote under his 
influence, with Pinsent substantially 
helping Wittgenstein to draft his only 
book review in English (I thank and 
acknowledge the Hon. Mrs Anne Keynes 
and Prof. Simon Keynes for access to 
these unpublished Pinsent manuscripts). 
A descendant of David Hume, emulating 
yet disputing with Wittgenstein, Pinsent 
began composing a philosophical work 
towards the end of his time with him. If 
this composition bears any relation to 
Wittgenstein’s own philosophies—and 
it would be a distant one—it would 
find its referent in the late 1930s. So it 
is not surprising that Russell found it 
disagreeable, as Pinsent noted. Francis 
Skinner more completely submerged 
himself in Wittgenstein’s identity via 
composition. One way that Wittgenstein 
acknowledged this was to dedicate Skinner 
as his custodian and editor of some of his 
other large volumes, long before Rhees, 
Anscombe, and others.
The Archive’s Contents
The Archive is written in Skinner’s hand, 
with revisions by him and also periodically 
by Wittgenstein. Not infrequently this 
process involved complex interplay 
between their complementary re-drafting 
of phrasing in both their handwriting, 
which lays bare some of Wittgenstein’s 
thought processes. This feature amounts 
to striking new data of how Wittgenstein 
creatively worked. The Archive consists of 
the following nine manuscripts:
1. The original Brown Book itself,  
with hitherto unknown new sentences  
in Wittgenstein’s handwriting on its 
opening pages. (It also displays a 
significant number of German paragraphs 
or sentences in Wittgenstein’s hand,  
on facing pages to the English text. 
These are often varying translations, or 
sometimes extend the notion there 
expressed in English.) 
2. A Pink Book, entitled Book I and Book 
II (composed of 14,200 words as well as 
many visual illustrations). It appears to be a 
fair copy, with revisions and the occasional 
paragraph added by Wittgenstein. It is very 
different from the “Yellow Book” fragments 
that Alice Ambrose published, with only 
occasional hints of superior overlap. There 
are grounds for supposing that it is what 
Wittgenstein wished to write instead of, or 
to replace the “Yellow Book”.
3. “Communication of Personal Experience” 
(at 12,000 words, this comprises the 
hitherto unknown extension after the 
ending of the published version of 
Brown Book), in fair copy form, with 
finely nuanced revision of details in 
Wittgenstein’s hand, and with cross-
referencing to the printed Brown Book.
4. Lectures on Philosophy (This manuscript 
is 20,352 words long, replete with lecture 
dates, the first of which is stated to be 
“Wedn. Jan 17th” [1934]). It is a series of 
carefully crafted notes with continuous 
arguments and strategies that do not 
correspond to any published narrative.
5. “Visual Image in his Brain” (comprised 
of 3,600 words, it was probably a private 
dictation to Skinner). Refined remarks in 
lecture note form.
6. Lectures on Self-Evidence and Logic 
(20,544 words). Almost detailed lecture 
notes, with evidence of revision prior to its 
final form. It comprises one term’s lectures, 
with evidence that the manuscript 
has been crafted and re-shaped in 
the direction of becoming a unified 
manuscript. Although it returns to the 
matter of self-evidence in the Tractatus and 
is concerned to challenge Russell’s views 
on logic and pure mathematics, yet it is not 
a repeat of earlier views. Rather, it newly 
develops denial of self-evidence.
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Wittgenstein’s dedication to Skinner; with thanks to William Truscott
7. Norwegian Notebook (4,400 words). Draft 
form. This was perhaps dictated to Skinner 
on his visit to Wittgenstein in Norway, 
while completed in Cambridge. 
8. A Mathematical Investigation. This 
manuscript is entirely constituted of 
precise unusual forms of calculations. 
Since it does not obviously have 
Wittgenstein’s hand expressed in it, there 
is a problem of ascription. Nevertheless, 
given that it is a component in an Archive 
that Wittgenstein himself gathered as 
an expression of his and Skinner’s joint 
work, we should at least allow space 
for it to be aired. It comprises 12,353 
mathematical symbols—without any 
narrative. It explores matters involving 
Fermat’s Little Theorem. Its deviation 
from the usual routes of calculation 
explicitly complements how Wittgenstein’s 
own philosophy exposes unexpected 
possibilities within the use of ‘rules’. 
9. An incomplete cyclostyled copy of the 
Blue Book. It is the only typescript in the 
Archive. Significantly, it ends prematurely, 
roughly at the same point as a later Skinner 
handwritten copy.
This last on the list is the least significant 
member of the Archive, though it signals 
a route to a research pathway. The Trinity 
College archivist, Jonathan Smith, who 
deals with its Wittgenstein Collections, 
has written a pioneering (forthcoming) 
chapter on the Blue Book (“Wittgenstein’s 
Blue Book: Reading Between the Lines” 
in N. Venturinha, The Textual Genesis of 
Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations. 
Routledge, 2013), analysing another newly 
discovered typed copy of the Blue Book 
given by Wittgenstein to Robert Thouless, 
recently acquired by Trinity College. This 
is highly annotated by Wittgenstein, and 
it has revisions in Skinner’s handwriting. 
For example, Skinner’s hand presents a 
revision “to speak about philosophy”, with 
Wittgenstein also including other changes 
(see image). Throughout the Archive there 
is a complex role for such interaction 
between Wittgenstein and Skinner, no 
doubt under the former’s direction.
My analysis of the Archive displays 
similar handwriting interaction between 
Wittgenstein and Skinner, but of a more 
substantial sort. By such means and 
others, the Archive displays great insights 
into Wittgenstein’s thought processes 
portrayed by the manuscripts. Not a few of 
these thought process are concerned, in 
original ways not published before, with 
the uses of advanced mathematics and its 
problems as analogies for the problems of 
mapping usage in natural languages and 
in philosophy.
Professor Arthur Gibson (Jesus College 
1970–73) is based in the Department of 
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Wittgenstein’s own handwriting also on the same page; with thanks to Trinity College, Cambridge
A new project to establish a Centre 
for the Study of Existential Risk (CSER) 
at the University of Cambridge has 
attracted widespread media coverage 
recently. The project was co-founded 
by the Bertrand Russell Professor 
Huw Price, Jaan Tallinn (one of the 
founders of Skype) and the eminent 
British astrophysicist, Lord Martin Rees. 
CSER will support research to identify 
and mitigate catastrophic risk from 
developments in human technology, 
including artificial intelligence. Further 
information and news is available from 
http://cser.org.
Onora O’Neill was one of seven 
philosophers giving evidence at the 
Leveson Inquiry into press ethics. In 
her written statement, she called for 
the current Press Complaints Code 
to be re-written claiming it was “not 
merely ineffective but defective” and 
said that journalists and editors should 
fully disclose their financial, commercial 
and property interests to demonstrate 
their capacity to be independent 
when reporting. The written and oral 
evidence by philosophers is available 
at: http://bit.ly/lev2012 
Philosophers in the News
Cambridge Project for 
Existential Risk
The Leveson Inquiry
Pure Mathematics and Mathematical 
Statistics, Cambridge University. He has 
just finished preparing the Wittgenstein-
Skinner archive manuscripts for his 
forthcoming book publication “Ludwig 
Wittgenstein Dictating Philosophy: to 
Francis Skinner”.
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Elizabeth Anscombe
Emily Thomas on one of the Cambridge greats
Elizabeth Anscombe (1919–2001) was  
one of the most significant philosophers 
of the twentieth century, known not 
just for her academic work, but also 
for her attachment to trousers, cigars 
and monocles. She spent most of her 
professional career at Cambridge, and 
held the Chair of Philosophy in the Faculty 
from 1970 until her retirement in 1986. 
Anscombe made significant contributions 
to ethics, philosophy of mind and 
metaphysics; she also acted as literary 
executor and translator for the work of her 
close friend Wittgenstein. 
Wittgenstein is reported to have 
disliked academic women in general, 
but Anscombe was the exception, and in 
recognition of her position in his affections 
he called her ‘old man’. Anscombe has also 
been dubbed ‘Dragon Lady’ and—as we 
will see—in the course of her career she 
certainly did not shy away from controversy. 
An example of how her philosophical 
views led her into controversy is her 
development of a Catholic principle 
known as the ‘doctrine of double effect’. 
Anscombe’s views on this doctrine are 
drawn from her famous and influential 
monograph Intention (1957) but she 
developed them in several further pieces, 
including “War and Murder” (1961). The 
doctrine draws a distinction between the 
intended outcomes of an action, and the 
unintended but foreseen ones. It holds that 
this distinction can be morally relevant, 
such that it is morally worse to intend harm 
rather than to foresee it. Consider a doctor 
administering morphine to a terminally 
ill patient, an act which will shorten the 
patient’s life. The doctor may be intending 
the patient’s death, or the doctor may be 
intending to deliver pain relief with the 
foreseen, but unintended ‘double effect’ of 
the patient’s death. One might argue that, 
in the former scenario, the doctor is morally 
culpable, whilst in the second scenario the 
doctor is not. Anscombe certainly took this 
view, and she applied the doctrine to a 
number of contemporary issues.
Consider, for example, Anscombe’s view 
of the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki at the end of the Second World 
War. When it was proposed that Oxford 
should give President Harry Truman an 
honorary degree, Anscombe opposed the 
move because of his role in the bombing. 
In a privately circulated pamphlet (later 
published), entitled Mr. Truman’s Degree 
(1956), Anscombe writes:
In the bombing of these cities [Hiroshima 
and Nagasaki] it was certainly decided to 
kill the innocent as a means to an end. And 
a very large number of them, all at once, 
without warning, without the interstices of 
escape or the chance to take shelter...
Choosing to kill the innocent as a means 
to your ends is always murder... I intend 
my formulation to be taken strictly; each 
term is necessary. For killing the innocent, 
even if you know as a matter of statistical 
certainty that the things you do involve 
it, is not necessarily murder. I mean that if 
you attack a lot of military targets, such as 
munitions factories and naval dockyards, as 
carefully as you can, you will be certain to 
kill a number of innocent people; but that is 
not murder.
We can read this passage in light of the 
doctrine of double effect. Anscombe 
is distinguishing between the military 
strategist who intends to kill the innocent, 
and the strategist who intends some other 
effect—such as destroying 
a munitions factory—but 
realises that this will entail 
the double effect of killing 
innocents. Anscombe is 
arguing that the actions of 
the strategist are morally 
worse in the first scenario, 
and further that Truman is 
akin to the first strategist: he 
intended to kill the innocent. 
Whether or not Anscombe 
is correct about Truman’s 
motivations, her views on 
the matter are very much in 
line with her more general 
philosophical principles. 
It is worth noting that, 
despite her efforts, Truman 
was awarded the degree, 
although Anscombe did 
succeed in pushing the 
motion to a vote. And her 
pamphlet is now a classic of 
moral philosophy.
Anscombe’s work has 
been extremely influential. 
Her work on intention in 
particular, is regarded as a 
landmark in philosophy of mind: just last 
year a new collection of essays appeared on 
it, and a number of influential philosophers 
including Michael Thompson (University 
of Pittsburgh) explicitly see themselves as 
following her. Anscombe is a systematic, 
original and brilliant thinker, and there is 
no doubt that her work will continue to be 
discussed for a long time to come.
Emily Thomas (Christ’s College) is a PhD 
student in the Faculty.
G.E.M. Anscombe. Photo: B.J. Harris
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